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SPACES AND CHALLENGES: FEMINISM IN LEGAL 
ACADEMIA 
SUSAN B. BOYD† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Women now make up at least 50 per cent of students in the entry classes in 
most Canadian law schools.1 Moreover, in some schools such as my own, 
women constitute about 50 per cent of the tenured or tenure stream profes-
soriate—a marked change from my arrival at the UBC Faculty of Law in 
1992. This feminization of legal education is not the result of affirmative 
action,2 but rather the increased acceptability of a legal education for women 
(as compared to fields like engineering), the removal of formal and informal 
barriers to women’s admission to law school, and women’s strong academic 
records.3 According to UBC’s director of JD admissions, more women than 
                                                                    
†  Professor and Chair in Feminist Legal Studies, University of British Columbia Faculty of 
Law. Thanks to Nicola Barker, Janine Benedet, Kim Brooks, Emma Cunliffe, Kalamity 
Hildebrandt, Bree Makohn, and Claire Young for providing comments on various drafts. 
All infelicities remain my own. Thanks to Bree Makohn for research assistance. 
1  Mary Jane Mossman, The First Women Lawyers: A Comparative Study of Gender, Law and 
the Legal Professions (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006) at 2. 
2  Worthy though affirmative action policies can be in enhancing participation of under-
represented groups, they have not directed law school admissions or hiring processes at 
my law school. 
3  Many anecdotes have been told about law school administrators attempting to keep 
women students out of law schools earlier in the history of legal education, even after 
women could be formally admitted. See W Wesley Pue, Law School: The Story of Legal 
Education in British Columbia (Vancouver: UBC Faculty of Law, 1995) at 234. The move 
to a more objective system of assessing applicants based on the Law School Admissions 
Test and grades arguably has favoured women, although the LSAT creates other sorts of 
barriers, both financial and psychological. See generally Dawna Tong & W Wesley Pue, 
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men have applied for entry to Canadian law schools in recent years.4 The 
reverse tends to be true for applications for faculty positions at my law school 
(especially for senior positions), but women have been successful neverthe-
less in being shortlisted and appointed to tenured or tenure stream positions. 
These women may identify as feminists, but they do not necessarily offer 
feminist legal perspectives in their courses, for reasons that I identify below. 
Despite the fact that legal academia is now populated by virtually equal 
numbers of women and men, and despite the greater visibility of women (in-
cluding feminist women) in positions of power, there remains a critical need 
for feminist presence, analysis, and critique in the 21st century. Indeed, femi-
nist insight has never been needed more, not least due to its capacity to chal-
lenge complacencies about law’s relationship to social justice and its efforts to 
deal with diversity. Feminism provides an important paradigm through 
which ongoing and shifting relations of power and inequality can be re-
vealed. These oppressive relations prevail in the face of an often relentless 
gender neutrality of corporatist, neo-liberal governance regimes—regimes 
that actually make it harder to recognize inequalities. If critical thinking5 is 
important to legal practice in an increasingly complex world, feminism is an 
important way to enhance it. Among other things, feminism has identified 
the problems of treating substantive legal fields as “silos” that do not intersect 
and interact in actual legal transactions. Feminist legal scholars have also em-
phasized the need to rethink legal categories and doctrines that have con-
tributed to the disadvantaged position of women and other groups.6 
                                                                                                                                               
“The Best and the Brightest?: Canadian Law School Admissions” (1999) 37 Osgoode 
Hall LJ 843 at 874. 
4  In the 2008/09 and 2009/10 academic years, 54 per cent of the applicants to Canadian 
common law schools were female, versus 46 per cent male. Approximately 53 per cent of 
the offers went to women versus 47 per cent to men. Approximately even numbers of 
male and female students registered in 2009 in Canadian common law schools. At UBC 
in 2009, 52 per cent of registered students in fall 2009 were women and 48 per cent male. 
See email from Elaine Borthwick (9 June 2010). 
5  See generally John Allemang, “Critical Thinking” The Globe and Mail (12 June 2010) F1 
(interview with Martha Nussbaum); Martha C Nussbaum, Not For Profit: Why Democ-
racy Needs the Humanities (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
6  See Regina Graycar & Jenny Morgan, The Hidden Gender of Law, 2d ed (Sydney: The 
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Feminism is also important because women continue to encounter barri-
ers in gaining access to justice for reasons related to gender, in addition to 
other factors such as poverty. For example, despite the many law reforms in 
relation to sexual assault and evidence law, female complainants continue to 
encounter significant barriers in the criminal law system.7 Feminism also has 
much to contribute to complex questions such as whether Muslim women 
who are sexual assault complainants are entitled to wear the niqab when giv-
ing evidence8 because feminism itself has been challenged and complicated 
over the years by engagement with the diversities of race, class, culture, relig-
ion, and sexuality.9 Those who have taken up this challenge are particularly 
well positioned to speak to important legal and social issues such as these. 
This essay draws partly on my own experience as a law student and law 
professor over the past 35 years, as well as the experience of students with 
whom I have engaged over that period. My argument is that although many 
important changes have taken place in legal academia, and spaces made for 
individuals who were previously excluded, serious challenges remain, making 
it essential that a feminist presence and voice and a commitment to social 
justice be central. I end by briefly considering whether and how that feminist 
voice is changing in the 21st century. 
II. LEGAL EDUCATION: CHANGING TIMES AND NEW 
SPACES 
I went to law school at McGill University in the mid-1970s, shortly after 
                                                                                                                                               
Federation Press, 2002) at 1–3. 
7  See e.g. Lise Gotell, “Rethinking Affirmative Consent in Canadian Sexual Assault Law: 
Neoliberal Sexual Subjects and Risky Women” (2008) 41 Akron L Rev 865; Janine 
Benedet & Isabel Grant, “Hearing the Sexual Assault Complaints of Women with Mental 
Disabilities: Consent, Capacity, and Mistaken Belief ” (2007) 52 McGill LJ 243; Chris-
tine Boyle, “Reasonable Doubt in Credibility Contests: Sexual Assault and Sexual Equal-
ity” (2009) 13 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 269. 
8  See R v NS (2009), 95 OR (3d) 735, 191 CRR (2d) 228 (Sup Ct J), rev’d in part 2010 
ONCA 670, 102 OR (3d) 161. 
9  See Emily Grabham et al, eds, Intersectionality and Beyond: Law, Power and the Politics of 
Location (New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009). 
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women began to enter law school in significant numbers, but well before 
women’s place in law was taken for granted and certainly before courses such 
as “women and the law” were offered. Indeed my own legal education con-
tained very little by way of “perspectives” on law, or explicit discussions of law 
in its wider social, economic, and political context. The one exception that I 
recall was the first year course Foundations of Canadian Law, which included 
a section on Aboriginal title, thanks to Professor Patrick Glenn. Most courses 
remained traditionally doctrinal in content and the most common pedagogy 
was the lecture method, sometimes varied by the Socratic method, the use of 
which quite frankly terrorized me in first year Contracts! Feminism and so-
cial justice were rarely mentioned, if at all, even in courses such as Jurispru-
dence. 
Having thrived in my undergraduate programs in history and sociology, 
and having had a taste of the new field of women’s studies, I found law school 
both dry and a shock. For some reason, I persevered, although I never felt 
like an “insider” during my legal education. My sense of being an outsider10 
was probably due to three factors: my family background included no law-
yers and, in fact, no one else with a university degree; I did not come from an 
upper middle class family, as did many students at my law school; and I was 
most intellectually engaged with questions that I now recognize were then 
more typically asked by legal sociologists than by law professors. I emerged 
from law school intact but unclear about my future path as a lawyer as I 
watched most of my colleagues transition smoothly to articling. I eventually 
was called to the Ontario bar, but also completed graduate degrees in inter-
national and comparative law. 
By the time I became a law professor in the mid-1980s, after being an in-
house consultant with the Law Reform Commission of Canada, things were 
changing quite rapidly. Legal scholars and teachers were beginning to look 
outside law’s paradigm and to ask critical questions about it, often drawing 
on work in other disciplines.11 “Law in context” and “law and society” 
                                                                    
10  See Natasha Bakht et al, “Counting Outsiders: A Critical Exploration of Outsider Course 
Enrollment in Canadian Legal Education” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall LJ 667 at 672 (“out-
siders” are “members of groups that have historically lacked power in society or have tradi-
tionally been outside the realms of fashioning, teaching, and adjudicating the law”). 
11  See Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, Law and Learning: Report to 
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courses were springing up, as well as courses on “women and the law.” More-
over, feminists were challenging the very way in which law was taught.12 At 
Carleton University’s Department of Law, which was housed in a Faculty of 
Social Sciences and held a somewhat more interdisciplinary mandate than 
the typical law school did at the time, I was able to develop seminars such as 
Feminist Legal Theory. More striking perhaps, when I was recruited to take 
up the new chair in women and the law (later renamed chair in feminist legal 
studies) at the UBC Faculty of Law in 1992, I was also able to develop 
courses related to feminism in law. In both university settings, however, I was 
expected also to teach “bread and butter” courses, usually Family Law in my 
case. It was, and is, unusual for feminist legal scholars to be appointed exclu-
sively for their expertise as such, just as it is unusual for legal scholars to be 
appointed for their expertise in racism and law or sexual orientation and law. 
These may be value-added fields of expertise, but they generally accompany 
another field typically viewed as “core” in a law school curriculum. 
UBC Law’s endowment of a research chair in women and the law in the 
early 1990s was nevertheless quite remarkable and it was the first such per-
manent chair in Canada. It is interesting to consider the conditions under 
which this chair was created. Some research indicates that many institutional 
settings in Canada were more willing to deal with women’s inequality in the 
early 1990s than they were before, or after.13 Arguably, this period repre-
sented an all too brief heyday of (liberal) feminism. UBC appointed Lynn 
Smith as its first female dean of law in 1991, and she had long been involved 
in the women’s movement and organizations such as the Women’s Legal 
Education and Action Fund (“LEAF”). A few other feminist legal scholars 
had also been hired in the late 1980s under the previous dean, Peter Burns. 
                                                                                                                                               
the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Ottawa: Social Sciences 
and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 1983) at 155. 
12  See Jenny Morgan, “The Socratic Method: Silencing Cooperation” (1989) 1 Legal Educ 
Rev 151. 
13  See e.g. Lise Gotell, “The Discursive Disappearance of Sexualized Violence: Feminist Law 
Reform, Judicial Resistance, and Neo-Liberal Sexual Citizenship” in Dorothy E Chunn, 
Susan B Boyd & Hester Lessard, eds, Reaction and Resistance: Feminism, Law, and Social 
Change (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 127 at 128–31. 
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Perhaps it also helped that the funding for the chair came from a combi-
nation of private donations and a time-limited government-matching 
scheme. The chair was therefore positioned as additional to others in the 
Faculty of Law, with separate funding. Moreover, the initial mandate of the 
chair was “women and the law,” a more neutral casting than “feminist legal 
studies.” Another factor that may have enhanced support for the new chair, 
even among colleagues who may have been less than enthusiastic about pri-
oritizing this field, was that its very existence meant that they themselves did 
not need to deal with students with feminist interests. These students could 
be directed to me for answers to their questions, or they could be advised to 
take my courses if they were interested in feminism. As a result, existing 
courses (the “core”) would not have to be altered. 
My intention is not to be negative or to suggest that UBC Law should 
not be celebrated for its decision to establish a chair in women and the law. 
Many members of the Vancouver legal community worked long and hard to 
make this chair happen and UBC Law is now squarely on the academic map 
as a law school with a strong feminist presence. According to our director of 
JD admissions, UBC Law attracts a significant number of students interested 
in feminist legal studies and social justice, and our Centre for Feminist Legal 
Studies (which celebrated its 10th anniversary in 2007) is publicized as one 
of the strengths of the school. In addition to our courses on feminism and 
law, at least one of which is taught every year, some sections of courses in the 
“core” curriculum (e.g. Tax Law, Evidence, Criminal Law, Torts, Administra-
tive Law, and Corporations) are taught by feminist law professors, so that 
many students are exposed to at least some feminist angle on various fields of 
law. 
III. LEGAL EDUCATION: ONGOING CHALLENGES 
Given these positive developments, why would I insist that a strong feminist 
presence in legal education must still be nurtured? Has feminism not been 
mainstreamed into legal academia by now, in part as a result of the value-
added approach mentioned earlier? To understand my argument that femi-
nism remains necessary to legal education, let me raise some issues and place 
them within the context of shifts in legal education during a period of neo-
liberal governance and increased privatization and corporatism. These socio-
economic trends have profoundly influenced universities, which increasingly 
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operate on a corporate model in the face of reduced government funding, 
with costs being privatized where possible, where “academic plans” sound 
increasingly like business plans, and where “outputs” such as publications are 
counted.14 
The first issue is that the critical thinking that Martha Nussbaum has re-
cently reminded us is so important15 is still not central to legal education. 
The “core” curriculum remains a powerful presence in Canadian law facul-
ties, despite the addition of “law in context” courses on its periphery.16 What 
this means is that most law school administrations take the position that 
courses that are “core”—not necessarily mandatory, but viewed as essential to 
a student’s legal education—must be offered and staffed as a priority. “Law 
and” courses, such as Feminism and Law or Social Justice and Law courses, 
are a lesser priority, and are not necessarily offered every year. As a result, stu-
dents can easily design their upper year program to be virtually devoid of 
critical approaches to law. 
Law students are easily seduced by the core curriculum, for various rea-
sons. We live in an era during which law school tuition fees have risen expo-
nentially (to over $10 thousand per year in most provinces), as government 
funding drops and law schools are encouraged to move towards operating on 
a cost recovery basis. Students who do not have access to wealth incur signifi-
cant debt to complete the three years of law school, which typically follow an 
undergraduate degree such as a BA where many students accumulate a debt 
load.17 The incentive for students to obtain articling positions and junior 
lawyer positions in large law firms is significant. The larger firms not only pay 
                                                                    
14  See Susan B Boyd, “Corporatism and Legal Education in Canada” (2005) 14 Soc & Leg 
Stud 287; Marilee Reimer, ed, Inside Corporate U: Women in the Academy Speak Out  
(Toronto: Sumach Press, 2004); Margaret Thornton, “The Demise of Diversity in Legal 
Education: Globalisation and the New Knowledge Economy” (2001) 8 Int’l J Legal Prof 
37. 
15  See Nussbaum, supra note 5. 
16  See Annie Rochette & W Wesley Pue, “‘Back to basics’? University Legal Education and 
21st Century Professionalism” (2001) 20 Windsor YB Access Just 167 at 180–83. 
17  See Bakht et al, supra note 10 at 719; Jo-Anne Pickel, “What Will Rising Tuition Fees 
Mean for Law and Learning?” (2003) 18 CJLS 67. 
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higher salaries, but once they hire a student, they are more likely to cover the 
student’s expenses during bar admission courses and even pay a portion of 
their third year university fees. In addition, opportunities for articling are 
more limited, and less well paid, for students who want to practice public 
interest or social justice law. All of this corrals students into the larger firms 
where a corporate ethos often dominates, which may mean that courses such 
as Feminist Legal Studies on student transcripts are not valued or viewed as 
suspicious. 
Such suspicion may be informed by a general “backlash” against feminism 
and a sense that we live in a post-feminist era.18 Students themselves may be 
far more comfortable expressing an interest in environmentalism or anti-
racist or anti-poverty work than they are with identifying with feminism. 
Feminist students have in the past expressed concern to me about the impli-
cations of having feminist courses or feminist volunteer work on their re-
sumés, although UBC Law’s Career Services personnel indicate that this 
concern has waned.19 As a result of these pressures, business law tends to 
dominate law schools even if many diverse course offerings exist, as they do at 
my school. Students are advised to be sure to take Corporations and Tax, 
even if they have no interest in practicing in these fields, because they are 
more practical and are on the bar admission exams. While I endorse the value 
of a generalist law degree, my point is that students are rarely advised to be 
sure to take a critical thinking course such as Feminist Legal Theory. The 
new minimum requirements for an accredited Canadian common law degree 
proposed by the Federation of Law Societies in October 2009 are not likely 
to foster enthusiasm for “outsider” courses, but rather to dampen it.20 
                                                                    
18  See Dorothy E Chunn, Susan B Boyd & Hester Lessard, “Feminism, Law, and Social 
Change: An Overview” in Chunn, Boyd & Lessard, supra note 13, 1. 
19  See emails from Pamela Cyr, Jennifer Poon, and Tracy Wachmann (14 June 2010). 
20  See Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Task Force on the Canadian Common Law 
Degree: Final Report (October 2009) (Chair: John JL Hunter), online: <http://www 
.flsc.ca/en/pdf/CommonLawDegreeReport.pdf>. For a history of this proposal and criti-
cal reactions to it by Canadian law teachers, see “Special Feature—Dialogue on Legal 
Education in Common Law Canada” (2009) Can Legal Educ Ann Rev 135. 
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Student enrolment in feminist law courses has diminished in the 21st 
century, at least at some law schools, and it has never been high. Approxi-
mately seven to eight per cent of law students take a feminist law course.21 
These low numbers may reflect wariness on the part of some anti-sexist stu-
dents to engage with what they see as mainstream feminism produced by 
academic feminists who are often privileged along lines such as race, class, 
and disability status. Having said this, other reasons why students do not take 
these classes include market pressures, not wanting their beliefs to be chal-
lenged, stereotyped perceptions of such courses, fear about extra workload, 
and lack of clarity about their importance.22 Diminished student enrolment 
in feminist law courses may also in part be due to a proliferation of other 
“outsider” courses, which in itself, is not a bad thing.23 
If market and other pressures influence even fewer students to take femi-
nist law courses, the low enrolment dictates cancellation or offering such 
courses in alternative years only. The knock-on effect of diminished feminist 
course offerings is that hiring of professors who specialize in feminist legal 
studies or related fields becomes a lower priority. Margaret Thornton tells 
the story of one Australian law school that terminated the services of five 
feminist and socio-legal scholars during a period of organizational change, 
due to their failure to meet the imperative of “professional practice.”24 While 
I have not heard of any such extreme stories in Canada, we have not yet en-
tered an era when feminists can proudly advertise their feminist credentials 
to all prospective employers, whether these be law firms or law schools. 
When hiring of faculty members takes place, finding candidates who can 
teach in core areas—especially the first year “core” courses such as Property, 
Contracts, Criminal Law, and Torts—often takes priority, even in law 
schools with feminists in the dean’s office. As well, law schools often snap up, 
                                                                    
21  See Bakht et al, supra note 10 at 698. 
22  See ibid at 714–28. 
23  “Outsider” courses are defined as those courses for which an outsider orientation (e.g. 
critical race, Aboriginal, feminist, queer, disability, or class oppression) is central to the 
very nature of the course. See ibid at 672. 
24  See Margaret Thornton, “The Dissolution of the Social in the Legal Academy” (2006) 25 
Australian Feminist Law Journal 3 at 12. 
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as rare commodities, candidates in fields where it is difficult to lure lawyers 
away from lucrative private practices, such as business and tax law. Graduate 
students who have focused their research on “core” fields are more likely to be 
offered interviews than those who have worked more squarely within fields 
such as feminist legal theory, lesbian legal studies, critical race theory and law, 
and so on. At our faculty, we have been fortunate to recruit several professors 
who contribute to the “core” fields and who also identify as feminist. How-
ever, few of these professors teach in the feminist curriculum, and their ener-
gies are often taken up by activities related to the “core.” Feminists may well 
be hired, but the rationale for their recruitment is rarely first and foremost 
for their expertise in feminist theory. 
One might argue that it is sufficient to have feminist legal scholars teach-
ing in the core areas, because they will infuse these courses with feminist in-
sight. Specialized feminist law courses might not, then, be necessary. While 
this development would be welcome, debates continue about whether “main-
streaming” entirely resolves the question of incorporating outsider perspec-
tives into legal education.25 Moreover, feminism has not yet been main-
streamed across the law curriculum in the way that mandates elimination of 
specialized courses, although the situation is much improved from the 1970s. 
One problem is that not all professors are motivated to include feminist 
analysis and some are wary of doing so or even hostile. Another is that in 
most “core” courses, there is so much content to cover that the time spent on 
feminist perspectives is likely to be minimal, even if the course is taught by a 
feminist. Finally, if only some sections of a core course feature feminist con-
tent, students tend to worry—and complain—that they are not being taught 
the “real” law and that the approach being taken is “biased” or “subjective.” 
Why is it important to feature feminist analysis of law? Many law stu-
dents arrive at law school with an often unconscious allegiance to liberalism, 
the dominant (and therefore often unarticulated) political philosophy in 
North America, which assumes that everyone is more or less on a level play-
ing field and, if given the opportunity to compete under “objective” legal 
norms, will be able to succeed. Given the extent to which law is embedded in 
liberalism, it takes time and a conscious effort to educate those studying law 
                                                                    
25  See Bakht et al, supra note 10 at 679. 
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in the ways that the liberal values underlying most legal norms may marginal-
ize those for whom the level playing field does not work well, such as poor 
women and indigenous peoples. Even a course in feminist legal theory barely 
scrapes the surface of this sort of critical analysis. Expecting that complex 
feminist analysis that develops a nuanced mode of critique will be taught in 
courses such as Taxation, Evidence, or even Family Law (which involves 
many issues involving gender, race, and sexual orientation) is unrealistic. 
As well, those professors who explicitly introduce feminist perspectives 
into their core courses almost inevitably encounter resistance or even hostil-
ity from some law students—even sometimes students who are sympathetic 
to feminism. Feminist and other critical perspectives such as critical race the-
ory are too often viewed as additional and peripheral to what is viewed as the 
central purpose of the course—learning a “neutral” set of legal norms and 
procedures—especially if other professors are not introducing them in their 
core courses. A feminist professor who tries to thoroughly infuse a “core” 
course with critical analysis of existing norms is almost certain to be penal-
ized by students on her teaching evaluations. My relatively non-ambitious 
efforts to raise questions about gendered inequalities and sexual orientation 
in some parts of my Family Law course are typically criticized by several stu-
dents on their course evaluations, and they often inflate the extent to which 
these questions permeate the course. I also receive applause from students 
but, ironically, strongly feminist students often find my course rather too 
liberal and pluralist! All of these problems point towards the need for spe-
cialized courses in feminism and law, as well as mainstreaming, at least for the 
time being until the law school curriculum is thoroughly infused with critical 
perspectives. 
And what of working conditions for feminist professors in the relatively 
privileged professional realm of legal academia? The good news is that with 
more women in an academic unit, committee work can be spread among 
women—a welcome change from the days when finding one woman for 
every committee meant that the few female professors were stretched across 
numerous committees, typically incurring a far heavier service workload than 
their male colleagues, a fact not valued to any great extent in tenure and 
promotion processes. As well, maternity and parental leave benefits have im-
proved, and my observation is that more female (and feminist) professors are 
having babies than was so in my generation—even prior to obtaining tenure. 
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Balancing an academic workload with responsibility for young children is 
not easy,26 but more women are doing it, and some men too are taking paren-
tal leave. As a result, institutional cultures may be pushed to adapt to the real-
ity that workers are also parents. 
The bad news in terms of work/life balance is that the requirements for 
securing tenure have become more onerous over the years in terms of pub-
lishing, securing research funding, obtaining strong teaching scores, and so 
on.  For scholars who have children or other care giving responsibilities, bal-
ancing—and meeting—the various performance demands can be tough. 
Since care giving for children and elderly parents remains a primarily female 
responsibility, these demands can be tougher on women than men. As well, 
over the same period that expectations in terms of grant-getting and publish-
ing have increased, public funding for feminist projects has diminished, for 
instance, with elimination of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council strategic funding program on Women and Change, and cancellation 
of policy research funding for Status of Women Canada. 
Workload issues are also complex for feminists who take seriously their 
responsibilities to students and community. Those feminist scholars who 
donate their expertise to community groups or who spend considerable 
amounts of time mentoring students or who work on labour intensive uni-
versity committees are unlikely to be adequately recognized for this extra 
work. Indeed, they are likely to be penalized if the extra work means that 
they are not able to meet the standards of publishing or grant-getting. The 
extra demands on professors who are women of colour or indigenous to be 
mentors and role models and representatives on committees are particularly 
onerous.27 My feminist colleagues seem to contribute a disproportionate 
amount of time to mentoring students and colleagues, offering expertise to 
community groups, and doing administrative work. These contributions are 
                                                                    
26  See Pam E Hirakata & Judith C Daniluk, “Swimming Upstream: The Experience of Aca-
demic Mothers of Young Children” (2009) 43 Canadian Journal of Counselling 283. 
27  See Camille A Nelson, “The Conflicting and Contradictory Dance: The Essential Man-
agement of Identity for Women of Colour in the Legal Academy” in Elizabeth Sheehy & 
Sheila McIntyre, eds, Calling for Change: Women, Law, and the Legal Profession (Ottawa: 
University of Ottawa Press, 2006) 117 at 120–33. 
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often rewarding and enhance the experience of students, colleagues, and the 
reputation of the university in the community, but may not be rewarded in 
the modern university system, which places heavy weight on publications 
and grant funding. I would not argue that mentoring students and fostering 
community should supplant our responsibility to disseminate our research 
through publication. However, the trend is clearly towards measuring output 
in a way that may marginalize scholars who also prioritize the value of com-
munity—an ironic move in an era when universities wish to proclaim their 
relevance. 
These trends must be placed within the “corporatization” of universities 
mentioned above. On the student side, education is constructed as a com-
modity, with students—and their future employers—as the consumers who 
demand results in order to warrant increasingly high tuition fees. Faculties 
whose primary mandate is to train “professionals,” such as law faculties, are 
particularly susceptible to the pressure to raise tuition fees, in part to subsi-
dize other faculties that are less able to demand such fees. This fee trend fur-
ther encourages those within law faculties to construct their primary man-
date as serving the business world (which has the most fundraising poten-
tial). If feminist legal knowledge is not constructed as a desired “product” 
within this paradigm, fewer feminist courses may be offered, and fewer femi-
nist legal scholars hired. 
This “corporatization” of universities also effectively means that certain 
feminists will succeed in academia whereas others will not—at least at a “re-
search-intensive” university such as my own. A feminist who is an active pub-
lisher and who receives significant research grants will be lauded by the uni-
versity. She will be set apart from the feminist who challenges the status quo 
of the way the law school operates, or who prioritizes her family life or the 
collegiality of her faculty over the demands of publishing, or who spends 
time with struggling or alienated students (who may more often be indige-
nous, racialized, lesbian or gay, or poor). A hierarchy of feminists within the 
university may therefore emerge. The “SuperWoman” who can do it all—at 
least for a time—will come out on top. 
Finally, the feminization of law schools reflects a particular demographic: 
A majority of law professors, including women, are still white and middle 
class. Legal academia thus has a tendency to reproduce its own image—not 
unlike any profession—in a way that reproduces racial and class-based ine-
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qualities. Schools that have hired racialized and indigenous women have of-
ten seen them leave the university to take up other positions. The small 
number remaining increasingly contrasts with growing numbers of racialized 
and indigenous students. My perception is that there may be more openness 
to interviewing racialized and indigenous scholars for academic positions, in 
recognition of the ongoing domination of white people in the university, 
than they are to interviewing scholars who readily own the political label of 
“feminist.” While diversifying the demographic of the legal professoriate is 
crucial, racialized feminists, especially those who work on race, gender and 
law, may be regarded as too challenging and not make the final cut. Even ini-
tiatives to increase the proportion of racially diverse appointments may be 
criticized as undermining the university’s mandate to promote “excellence.” 
Some time ago, after complaints about a more proactive employment equity 
statement, the UBC Board of Governors produced a statement that high-
lights merit and qualifications over diversifying the university’s demographic: 
“UBC hires on the basis of merit and is committed to employment equity. 
All qualified persons are encouraged to apply.”28 The Board of Governors 
seemed to be concerned that diversifying the professoriate could detract 
from the university’s goal of excellence rather than enhancing it. More work 
clearly needs to be done to think about excellence in relation to a diversity of 
backgrounds and perspectives. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Some challenges clearly remain, then, in relation to feminism and feminists 
in legal academia. Feminism remains somewhat at the margins of the law 
school enterprise, although feminist professors carry considerable workload.  
The terms under which we are present in law schools may be less than ideal, 
and corporatist changes in university culture appear to discourage rather 
                                                                    
28  UBC Human Resources, Advertising Guidelines, online: UBC <http://www.hr.ubc.ca/ 
faculty_relations/recruitmentguide/adguidelines.html> at 6.2.1. The current version of 
the statement encourages that the following language be added, but it is optional: 
UBC is strongly committed to diversity within its community and especially welcomes applica-
tions from visible minority group members, women, Aboriginal persons, persons with disabilities, 
persons of any sexual orientation or gender identity, and others who may contribute to the further 
diversification of ideas. 
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than encourage a feminist ethic. One might think that a law school’s vision 
would be one that clearly prioritized social justice, and that feminism and 
feminists would be viewed as central to accomplishment of that vision, given 
the key contribution that feminists have made to social and legal thought in 
the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Although social justice plays a more 
central role in law schools now than it did in, say, the 1970s, such questions 
have not yet been institutionalized in the way that most feminist legal schol-
ars call for. As Sanda Rodgers, a former dean of the University of Ottawa 
Faculty of Law, has said: 
Canadian law schools actively practise and reproduce systems of discrimina-
tion. . . . Law schools, singly and collectively, have a legal and moral obliga-
tion to institutionalize an educational commitment to an equality agenda. 
. . . Transformation for equality must be a core value, perhaps the only core 
value, of legal education.29 
And yet, feminists who take up positions of power in universities almost al-
ways end up curtailing their feminism while in those positions, often in an 
effort to appear to be even-handed as between various constituencies, and so 
as not to alienate potential donors who may not appreciate the need for 
feminist perspectives. Prioritizing equality, social justice, or feminism is al-
most impossible within such a paradigm. 
Having raised various challenges facing feminists in legal academia, I 
want to end on an optimistic note. Feminists with diverse perspectives par-
ticipate in law schools more than ever before. We sit on numerous commit-
tees that influence policy at various levels of the university and teach a variety 
of courses. In contrast to the suggestion made by some that young women are 
eschewing feminism, my experience is that each year our law school admits a 
committed group of feminists and pro-feminist men for whom social justice 
is central, and who want their legal work to make a difference. Their fields of 
interest and activism are diverse, and they are smart and articulate. Some-
times they work on issues that have particular pertinence in the post-9/11 
                                                                    
29  Sanda Rodgers, “Educating for Equality: The Meaning of Feminist Administration for 
Legal Education in Canada” in Elizabeth Sheehy & Sheila McIntyre, eds, Calling for 
Change: Women, Law, and the Legal Profession (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 
2006) 149 at 150. 
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era, such as the discriminatory impact of immigration and security measures. 
Or, they might work on environmentalism, queer issues such as transgender 
rights, or issues related to poverty or racism. Many are very interested in in-
ternational social justice work. Sometimes these issues do not clearly have a 
“feminist” component, at least not in the sense of a clear focus on eliminating 
women’s inequality; but they almost always have something to do with 
women’s well-being. Others, though, work on questions that have long been 
central to the women’s movement, such as reproductive rights. A few years 
ago, a group of women students at my law school initiated a “Law Students 
for Choice” group, which has brought guest speakers to the school and at-
tracted large audiences. All of these students are claiming their own space in 
law school, and they point towards an approach to law that centres feminism 
as one of many aspects of social justice, including anti-racism, queer theory, 
and anti-ableism. 
I find them inspiring and their presence and their actions convince me 
that the gender neutral trends of neo-liberalism will not go unchallenged. 
Indeed, I am optimistic that these students will expand their demands for a 
legal education that is informed by feminism and other “outsider” perspec-
tives, and work with their teachers to realize the goal of making law a tool 
that works for everyone. As one Canadian study found, students who plan to 
take outsider courses do so primarily because they see the material as being 
relevant to today’s world.30 Hopefully they will carry this ethic and their criti-
cal thinking into the legal profession and encourage its adaptation to the di-
verse population that it now serves. 
                                                                    
30  See Bakht et al, supra note 10 at 709, 730. 
